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Intent to Charge for Unsolicited Benefits 
Conferred in an Emergency:  A Case Study in 
the Meaning of "Unjust" in the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
Louis E. Wolcher* 
Abstract 
This Article is a legal and jurisprudential case study that attempts to 
shed light on the use of the word "unjust" in the law of restitution as it has 
been reinterpreted by the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment.  The particular case studied is the legal meaning of the term 
"intent to charge" in the law’s treatment of claims for unsolicited benefits 
conferred in emergencies.  The author conducts a thought experiment 
involving the use of a sworn "Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits 
Conferred" to illustrate certain ambiguities and difficulties in the way the 
new Restatement deals with this legal category.  The Article exploits the 
thought experiment and the difficulties it uncovers in order to advance the 
author’s primary purpose, which is to retrieve dialectically a certain 
necessary independence for the idea of justice in the development of the 
substantive law of unjust enrichment. 
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I.  Introduction:  The Third Restatement in Historical Context 
The curriculum of most modern American law schools relegates the 
law of restitution to the status of a bonbon, so to speak, to be served in other 
courses at the discretion of the instructor:  A sort of exotic hors d’oeuvre or 
after-dinner mint in classes where the real meat-and-potatoes consists of 
contracts, torts, or remedies.1  But while our law schools may have slighted 
this area of the law, the courts never have.  As Professor Hanoch Dagan has 
said, "While restitution receded from the American academic landscape and 
was marginalized in the law school curriculum, courts continued to develop 
the doctrine, facing new problems and refining the rules dealing with 
benefits-based civil liability."2  Thanks to the herculean efforts of Professor 
Andrew Kull and his diligent band of advisers, the American Law Institute 
has at last delivered us the text of a brand new Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE).3  It is a monumental 
achievement.  Thankfully, this text manages to take account of many of the 
new developments to which Dagan refers that have intervened in American 
private law litigation since 1936,4 when the First Restatement was 
completed,5 and 1984, when the uncompleted Second Restatement issued 
its second (and last) tentative draft.6  Whatever impact the new Restatement 
may have on the future development of the law of restitution, I believe (and 
hope) that its completion and publication will encourage legal academics to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004) ("Only a bare 
handful of American law schools offer a restitution course these days, and few academics 
write in this area.  Restitution was subsumed under the general category of remedies or 
dissipated into the interstices of property, torts, and contract."). 
 2. Id. at 328. 
 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 1, at 3 ("John Langbein analyzes this unfortunate 
development as part of the ‘terrible toll that the realist movement has inflicted on doctrinal 
study.’"). 
 5. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]. 
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984) 
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT]. 
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give more visibility in the law school curriculum to this important but much 
neglected subject. 
Although a Reporter’s Note to the new Restatement states that the 
taxonomy of "the present Restatement follows the 1937 Restatement 
without apology,"7 the ALI’s official website also declares that the project’s 
name, which includes the words "restitution" and "unjust enrichment," 
restores the originally conceived title of the First Restatement as a way of 
emphasizing the fact that "the subject matter encompasses the independent 
body of law of unjust enrichment, and not simply the remedy of 
restitution."8 The R3RUE, by loudly proclaiming the inadequately 
understood legal point that restitutionary remedies are not the same as the 
substantive law of unjust enrichment, affirmatively invites judges, lawyers 
and legal academics to address the important question posed by Professor 
Douglas Laycock several years ago:  "What is it that makes enrichment 
unjust in the absence of some wrong for which the law would impose 
damage liability?"9 
I have taught a stand-alone class on restitution and unjust enrichment 
at regular intervals throughout my academic career.  I first learned about the 
subject at the feet of the great Jack Dawson, whose work in the field still 
remains very important,10 and who, together with George Palmer, wrote a 
superb casebook on the subject that has, alas, been out of print for a very 
long time.11  As someone who philosophizes a lot about legal themes, the 
main reason I enjoy teaching this subject so much is that its principal 
organizing concept contains the word "unjust."  This word appears to bring 
the concept of justice (as opposed to mere lawfulness) directly into the legal 
arena, thereby confounding (or at least complicating) the distinction 
between legal positivism and natural law theory.  The very first section of 
the R3RUE states:  "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of 
                                                                                                                 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 reporter’s 
note a (2011). 
 8. Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, AM. LAW INST., 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=14 (last visited Oct. 5, 
2011). 
 9. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1277, 1285 (1989). 
 10. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
(1951) [hereinafter UNJUST ENRICHMENT]; John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974). 
 11. JOHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE E. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1969).  
The other leading casebook on restitution, JOHN W. WADE, RESTITUTION:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2d. ed. 1966), is also out of print. 
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another is subject to liability in restitution." 12  The theme of justice shows 
itself in this formulation because the dyad "unjust enrichment" seems to 
name a state of affairs—injustice—that judges applying the law of 
restitution are supposed to pay attention to and care about. 
In America, at least, the law of restitution did not begin to be 
recognized as a separate discipline, displaying its own internal patterns of 
thought crossing the formal doctrinal boundaries of tort and contract, until 
the end of the nineteenth century, with the publication of A Treatise on the 
Law of Quasi-Contracts by Dean William Keener of the Columbia Law 
School.13  But, of course, the grand principle that no one should be enriched 
at another’s expense is of ancient origin.  Aristotle spoke of it,14 as did the 
second-century Roman jurist, Pomponius, who famously remarked that 
"this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s 
loss."15  The principle is said to rest on the aggravation to our sense of 
injustice that is felt whenever someone’s loss is accompanied by someone 
else’s corresponding unwarranted gain.16  According to Professor Dawson, 
                                                                                                                 
 12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).  The 
corresponding language in Section 1 of the First Restatement reads, "A person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."  The 
Second Restatement’s version of this topic’s organizing principle was rather less elegant:  
"A person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another person’s interest, 
or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary 
to prevent unjust enrichment."  SECOND RESTATEMENT § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). 
 13. WILLIAM KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893).  
Professor Dawson claimed that Keener’s treatise represents the first recognition in print of 
the many "interconnections" linking the various topics of restitution.  DAWSON, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 21.  The Introduction to the Second Restatement, on the 
other hand, asserts that "[t]he common elements of claims now called restitutionary were not 
widely perceived until well into [the twentieth] century."  Introduction to RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). 
 14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1131b32—1132a14, in 2 JONATHAN BARNES, ED., 
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1786 (1984). 
[T]he law looks only at the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the 
parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged . . . the 
suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to 
equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the 
assailant. 
Id. 
 15. DIG. 50.17.206 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18). 
 16. Professor Dawson, for example, wrote that the principle against unjust enrichment 
is almost instinctual, an "aspiration [that] lies deep in human nature."  DAWSON, UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 5.  Others have articulated this human aspiration in 
quantitative terms, claiming that the combination of the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s 
gain makes the plaintiff’s claim in restitution "twice" as impressive to our sense of justice.  
Lon Fuller & William Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 40 YALE L.J. 52, 
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it responds to "one of the basic questions of distributive justice,"17 and in its 
purest form it may even lie at the heart of Marx’s theory of exploitation.18 
Any doctrine that is as broadly and vaguely worded as this one 
promises to be extremely hard to translate into a system of legal rules, 
which is why Professor Dawson called the prohibition against unjust 
enrichment a "working hypothesis" rather than a definitive legal rule.19  The 
First Restatement, in its initial "General Scope Note," took the same point 
of view.20 
Notwithstanding the admittedly Delphic quality of the term "unjust 
enrichment," however, I like to remind my restitution students that it is 
quite rare in American law for the J-word ("justice") to show up explicitly 
in legal doctrine, even if only in the form of what the First Restatement 
calls a "general guide[] for the conduct of the courts."21  I also encourage 
my students to seize the opportunity for serious independent thinking (as 
distinguished from mere learning) that is afforded by the circumstance that 
the J-word actually does show up in this particular subject.  Whenever a 
judicial decision draws a line, and then proceeds to justify it by saying that 
on this side stands something like justice (i.e., the imperative to rectify 
unjust enrichment), I say that this gives law students a rare opportunity to 
think critically about the moral premises of the judgments that our courts 
make every day.  Critical thinking about the normative premises of the legal 
system also can help keep alive in law students the belief that the idea of 
justice as such, however one defines it, can be a criterion—or at least a 
trigger—for the ethically important task of evaluating what lawyers and 
judges do to other people in the name of what is merely legal or legally 
valid. 
                                                                                                                 
56 (1936). 
 17. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 5. 
 18. Id. at 40 (referring to Marx’s theory that the wage bargain unjustly permits the 
capitalist to pay less for the use of workers’ labor power than the value of the marginal 
product of their labor). 
 19. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 26. 
 20. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION pt. I, ch. 1, topic 1, intro. note (1937) ("In this 
Topic, these are stated in the form of principles.  They cannot be stated as rules since either 
they are too indefinite to be of value in a specific case or, for historical or other reasons, they 
are not universally applied."). 
 21. Id. 
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II.  The Distinction Between Unjust and Unjustified Enrichment 
Seen from the foregoing point of view, the R3RUE’s commentary on 
the concept of "unjust enrichment" proves to be somewhat disappointing.  
To be sure, the commentary does gesture at the role of justice as a possible 
meta-criterion for the substantive law of unjust enrichment, but it appears to 
do so rather grudgingly.  Moreover, what it gives with one hand, it takes 
away with the other.  The key text is Section 1’s Comment b, entitled 
"Unjust Enrichment."  Immediately after stating that "[t]he substantive part 
of the law of restitution is concerned with identifying those forms of 
enrichment that the law treats as ‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing 
liability,"22 the comment uses what can only be called a quasi-sociological 
tone in describing the views of those thinkers who believe there is a 
"special moral attractiveness" to the law of restitution: 
A significant tradition within English and American law refers to unjust 
enrichment as if it were something identifiable a priori, by the exercise 
of a moral judgment anterior to legal rules.  This equitable conception of 
the law of restitution is crystallized by Lord Mansfield’s famous 
statement in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 
681 (K.B. 1760):  "In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the 
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of 
natural justice and equity to refund the money."  Explaining restitution 
as the embodiment of natural justice and equity gives the subject an 
undoubted versatility, an adaptability to new situations, and (in the eyes 
of many observers) a special moral attractiveness.  Restitution in this 
view is the aspect of our legal system that makes the most direct appeal 
to standards of equitable and conscientious behavior as a source of 
enforceable obligations.23 
Having thus dutifully reported what "many observers" believe, the 
remainder of the comment pulls no punches in stating what the drafters of 
the new Restatement themselves really think the meaning of the word 
"unjust" should be.  And it would not be unfair, I believe, to characterize 
the expression of what they really think on this question as manifesting a 
particularly severe, if not puritanical, form of legal positivism: 
The concern of restitution is not, in fact, with unjust enrichment in any 
such broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to 
what might more appropriately be called unjustified enrichment.  
Compared to the open-ended implications of the term "unjust 
enrichment," instances of unjustified enrichment are both predictable 
                                                                                                                 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
 23. Id. 
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and objectively determined, because the justification in question is not 
moral but legal.  Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that lacks an 
adequate legal basis; it results from a transaction that the law treats as 
ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in ownership rights. . . .  
Because of its greater explanatory power, the term unjustified 
enrichment might thus be preferred to unjust enrichment, were it not for 
the established usage imposed by the first Restatement of Restitution.  
But while the choice between the two expressions may indicate a 
preferred vantage point, it implies no difference in legal outcomes.  As 
descriptions of the circumstances that give rise to legal liability, the 
terms unjust enrichment and unjustified enrichment are precisely 
coextensive, identifying the same transactions and the same legal 
relationships.  This is because—notwithstanding the potential reach of 
the words, and Lord Mansfield’s confident reference to "natural 
justice"—the circumstances in which American law has in fact 
identified an unjust enrichment resulting in legal liability have been 
those and only those in which there might also be said to be unjustified 
enrichment, meaning the transfer of a benefit without adequate legal 
ground.24 
If this passage means to assert that in every instance in which 
American courts have awarded a remedy in restitution they have relied on a 
well-established antecedent legal basis for concluding that the defendant’s 
enrichment was unjust, then I submit that it is an overstatement, to say the 
least.  Consider Bron v. Weintraub,25 for example, in which the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey used the principle (but not the "rule") of unjust 
enrichment to impose a constructive trust on title to real estate that the 
defendants had acquired in a lawful but highly inequitable manner.26  
Stating that "public policy is more than a mere summation of its past 
applications," the court quoted the following statement with approval: 
Sometimes . . . public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by 
statute; sometimes by judicial decision.  More often, however, it abides 
only in the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear 
consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just 
and right between man and man. . . .  When a course of conduct is cruel 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Bron v. Weintraub, 199 A.2d 625, 625 (N.J. 1964). 
 26. Id.  The defendants had purchased for a song the right to redeem title to real estate 
that had been sold decades before for non-payment of taxes, and then subsequently 
developed into residences that were resold to the innocent plaintiff-householders.  The court 
stated explicitly that it did not rest its decision imposing a constructive trust on account of 
the defendants’ unjust enrichment on the theory that they had acquired title fraudulently, or, 
for that matter, on any other theory of positive law outside the principle of unjust 
enrichment.  Id. at 627. 
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or shocking to the average man’s conception of justice, such course of 
conduct must be held to be obviously contrary to public policy, even 
though such policy has never been so written in the bond, whether it be 
Constitution, statute, or decree of court.27 
Not only did the Bron court declare the independence of the principle of 
unjust enrichment from all traditional sources of positive law, it actually 
applied the principle to the case before it.  Finding "no social value or 
contribution" in what the defendants did when, like any good capitalists, 
they used the resources of the law and the marketplace to enrich themselves 
at the expense of the plaintiffs, the court remarked:  "On the contrary, 
decent men must sense only revulsion in this traffic in the misfortune of 
others."28  It is impossible to find in the Bron decision any judicial 
awareness of a discretion-constraining antecedent "legal basis," as 
Comment b puts it, that would make the outcome "both predictable and 
objectively determined, because the justification in question is not moral 
but legal." 29  The very existence of decisions such as Bron underscores the 
danger to courts and scholars of falling into what Professor Dagan calls "the 
positivist trap of unjustified enrichment,"30 where the desire to equate 
unjust enrichment with legally unjustified enrichment can result in an 
"unwarranted simplification of this complex and diversified body of law."31 
Putting all questions of its descriptive accuracy aside, however, the 
way this comment describes the concept of unjust (as opposed to 
unjustified) enrichment reflects what appears to be an extremely narrow 
view of the judicial process.  In criticizing the idea of a "purely equitable 
account of the subject," the comment states: 
Saying that liability in restitution is imposed to avoid unjust enrichment 
effectively postpones the real work of definition, leaving to a separate 
inquiry the question whether a particular transaction is productive of 
unjust enrichment or not. In numerous cases natural justice and equity 
do not in fact provide an adequate guide to decision, and would not do 
so even if their essential requirements could be treated as self-evident. 
Unless a definition of restitution can provide a more informative 
generalization about the nature of transactions leading to liability, it is 
difficult to avoid the objection that sees in "unjust enrichment," at best, a 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 628 (quoting Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 506 
(Ohio 1916)). 
 28. Id. at 630. 
 29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
 30. DAGAN, supra note 1, at 18. 
 31. Id. at 25. 
INTENT TO CHARGE 919 
name for a legal conclusion that remains to be explained; at worst, an 
open-ended and potentially unprincipled charter of liability.32 
When this passage is read together with the balance of Comment b, its 
logical premise seems to be that the legal system is required to choose 
between two, and only two, possibilities.  First possibility:  The law can 
have clearly articulated antecedent rules that implement the specific 
policies of each area of restitution without the need for some overarching 
principle of maddening vagueness to "guide" the courts in the way the First 
Restatement said they should be guided.  Second possibility:  The law can 
allow individual judges to gather wool from some Cloud Cuckoo Land33 of 
personal morality where "something identifiable a priori" outside of 
positive law lets them know what is just and unjust in any given case.  What 
is more, it is quite clear from the tenor of Comment b that the drafters of the 
R3RUE wholeheartedly embrace the first possibility, and reject the second.  
They attempt to remove the fangs of the term "unjust enrichment" as a 
separate criterion of judgment by declaring that unjust enrichment and 
legally unjustified enrichment are "precisely coextensive," and "[i]n no 
instance does the fact or extent of liability in restitution depend on whether 
the source of that liability is conceived or described as unjust enrichment, 
as unjustified enrichment, or as a combination of the two."34  In this last 
passage, the drafters do not just attempt to exorcise the ghost of natural law 
theory from the R3RUE—they also express a particularly acute form of 
legal nominalism:  That is, they warn judges against relying too much (or at 
all) on the J-word in any of its forms.35  They seem to be saying that it is not 
the words "unjust enrichment" or even the neologism "unjustified 
enrichment" that matter but, rather, whether the plaintiff’s claim has "an 
adequate legal basis" that derives from some other, more particularized, 
section of the Restatement. 
It is important to understand that the matter at stake in this struggle for 
the soul of unjust enrichment is not, or at least not only, the question of 
whether the law of restitution should be cast in the form of precise legal 
rules or loosey-goosey legal standards.36  There are plenty of both kinds of 
                                                                                                                 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
 33. See Aristophanes, The Birds, in 2 THE COMPLETE GREEK DRAMA 733 (Whitney 
Oates & Eugene O’Neill eds., 1938) (explaining that , or "Cloud Cuckoo 
Land," is supposed to be a perfect city in the sky that the protagonists in Aristophanes’ 
comedy hope to erect). 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
 35. Id. 
 36. The best discussion of this important distinction in the form of legal norms is 
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legal norms in the new Restatement.37  Nor is the heart of the matter to be 
found in Ronald Dworkin’s analytic distinction between legal rules, which 
"set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions 
provided are met," and legal principles, which do not predict consequences 
in advance but nonetheless possess a "dimension of weight or importance" 
in the legal system.38 
I do not think that what is most at stake in the matter of the meaning of 
"unjust enrichment" is the same as the question of what antecedent form or 
content the law should give to the legal norms that judges apply in 
restitution cases.  If we insist on thinking of the concept unjust enrichment 
as a vessel that must contain some sort of a priori content or institutional 
history before it is applied (whether in the form of a vague "standard" or a 
"principle"), then the dilemma that the drafters of the R3RUE have 
expressed in Comment b appears quite compelling.  Adhering to the 
container view of legal norms makes it appear that we have to choose 
between radical nominalism and radical realism.  That is, we can have 
either a sturdy but empty vessel that merely captures the real content of 
other, more precise legal rules and standards in the Restatement or a leaky 
vessel full of idiosyncratic notions of justice and injustice that derive their 
content from God-knows-where.  If that is our only choice, then I believe 
that what Lon Fuller said about the Catholic tradition of natural law 
                                                                                                                 
found in Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976). 
 37. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 
(2011) (describing the standard-like norm for imposing an equitable lien), with id. § 59 
(describing the relatively more mechanical and hence rule-like norm for tracing). 
 38. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 25–26 (1977).  I daresay that 
Dworkin himself would probably not be happy with the R3RUE’s decision to deprive the 
principle of unjust enrichment of any independent jurisprudential weight.  Dworkin 
expresses the view that the saying "no man may profit from his own wrong" expresses an 
important legal "principle" even if it does not amount to a legal "rule": 
We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his own 
wrong, but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit from 
wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from their 
legal wrongs.  The most notorious case is adverse possession—if I trespass on 
your land long enough, some day I will gain a right to cross your land whenever 
I please. . . .  We do not treat these [sorts of cases] as showing that the principle 
about profiting from one’s wrongs is not a principle of our legal system, or that 
it is incomplete and needs qualifying exceptions. . . .  All that is meant, when we 
say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that the principle is one 
which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration 
inclining in one direction or another. 
Id. 
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thinking applies with equal force to the present situation—the quest for a 
"higher law" of divine or human justice to fill a positive legal vessel before 
it is applied is really just another form of positivism.39  Pre-existing law 
posited by explicit micro-rules declared in advance or pre-existing law 
posited by judges’ case-by-case interpretations of the general principle of 
unjust enrichment—either way of imagining how the legal system works—
leads inevitably to what John Chipman Gray called "the absurdity of the 
view of Law preexistent to its declaration."40 
Fortunately, this is not our only choice.  Traditional theories of legal 
positivism and natural law tend to presuppose that a legal or moral concept 
has a "content" that remains identical with itself throughout at least some 
length of time.41  That is, they presuppose that one can "lay down the law" 
for oneself at discrete moment t1 and then proceed to "follow" that law’s 
selfsame content at t2 and at all subsequent times.  But what if time were 
conceived of dialectically as a dynamic river, á la Heraclitus,42 rather than 
as an eternally strung string of selfsame beads, á la Parmenides?43  What if 
historical moments flowed and swirled into one another rather than 
remaining apart as hermetically sealed moments, separated from one 
another on an otherwise indifferent timeline?  If we think of law 
dialectically, there is a sense in which it always "postpones the real work of 
definition,"44 and despite the disapproving tone of these words in the 
R3RUE’s commentary, it is probably a good thing that it does.   
The concept of dialectics, though it has a complex philosophical 
history, will be used quite simply and non-technically in this Article.  I do 
not intend to tell you about dialectics, but rather to adopt a dialectical point 
of view to uncover an interesting and productive ambiguity in the R3RUE’s 
treatment of a legally significant category, called "intent to charge," as it 
appears in the substantive law of restitution dealing with unsolicited 
benefits conferred in an emergency.  Adorno’s definition of dialectics will 
suffice to get us on our way:  "The name dialectics says no more . . . than 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630, 648–57 (1958). 
 40. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 63 (David Campbell 
& Philip Thomas eds., 1997). 
 41. See Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS:  ESSAYS, APHORISMS, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277–300 (Peter Demetz ed., 1978) (providing an illustration 
of this concept). 
 42. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 55 (T.M. Robinson tr., 1987). 
 43. PARMENIDES, FRAGMENTS 55–91 (David Gallop tr. 1984). 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
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that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder [and] 
that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy."45  Even a 
robot can learn to copy analytic categories.46  But only a human being is 
capable of noticing that a legal concept, just like every abstraction, "does 
not exhaust the thing conceived."47 
"The determinable flow in every concept makes it necessary to cite 
others."48  It will be the task of this Article to demonstrate that there is a 
"determinable flow" in the concept of "intent to charge" that makes it 
necessary to cite another concept—that of unjust enrichment itself—in 
order to resolve the infinitely varied legal problems that can arise whenever 
a case involving unsolicited benefits conferred in an emergency comes to 
litigation.  While the precise legal topic is narrow, my intent in examining it 
could not be broader.  My goal is to help resuscitate the idea that the word 
"unjust" in unjust enrichment has a use in this area of the law which 
transcends all possible statements about it that attempt to reduce it—as the 
R3RUE’s commentary appears to do—to the status of a mere label for a 
conclusion reached on other legal grounds. 
The great legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart once said:  "Particular fact-
situations do not await us already marked off from each other, and labelled 
[sic] as instances of the general rule, the application of which is in question; 
nor can the rule itself step forward to claim its own instances."49  To believe 
otherwise is to commit the philosophical error of conflating an abstract 
concept with the concrete particulars to which it is or may be applied.  Such 
an "identitarian" theory of law risks becoming pure ideology,50 for every 
identifying judgment of the form "S is P" contains within it a non-identical 
element.  That this is logically intelligible to us stems from the observation 
that "every single object subsumed under a class has definitions which are 
not contained in the definitions of the class."51  And so, we shall see, do the 
objects subsumed by those identifying judgments that apply the law of 
restitution.  
                                                                                                                 
 45. THEODOR ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 5 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973). 
 46. Id. at 29–30. 
 47. Id. at 5. 
 48. Id. at 53. 
 49. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961). 
 50. ADORNO, supra note 45, at 148. 
 51. Id. at 150. 
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III.  The Location of Our Problem:  Somewhere Between the Republic of 
Restitution and Gift Island 
"In an outline of the sources of civil liability," Professor Laycock 
wrote, "the principal headings would be tort, contract, and restitution."52  
For many years, I have made use of an extended geographical metaphor in 
my classes on restitution to illustrate my own version of Laycock’s point.  I 
call this metaphor "The Geography of Restitution," and have even reduced 
it to a crudely drawn map, as if the law of restitution lay at the very center 
of a Middle Earth53 that is made up of several other sovereign heads of civil 
liability that are historically and conceptually related to the "Republic of 
Restitution" without being identical to it. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 52. Laycock, supra note 9, at 1277.  Professor Epstein has employed the metaphor of a 
"fourth wheel" to describe the substantive law of restitution:  "The common law coach runs 
not on three substantive wheels [property, contracts and torts] but on four."  Richard A. 
Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1994). 
 53. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HISTORIES OF MIDDLE EARTH, vols. 1–5 (2003). 
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On the map, the Kingdom of Contract, the Confederation of Torts, and 
Fiduciaria are all connected, in one way or another, to the northernmost part 
of the Republic of Restitution (Adjunctia Peninsula and Common County).  
Here, the concept "unjust" in the phrase "unjust enrichment" derives its 
meaning from some other body of law (contract, tort, or fiduciary duty), 
and restitution merely supplies a set of optional alternative remedies to 
claimants who do not, strictly speaking, need the substantive law of unjust 
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enrichment to establish their claims.54  South of Remedy Marsh, however, 
the lay of the land is quite different. Here, the legal remedies and equitable 
remedies furnished by the law of restitution in Law County and Equity 
County, respectively, are made available only to citizens of the city called 
Unjust Enrichopolis.  That is, in Unjust Enrichopolis, restitutionary 
remedies are afforded only to claimants who can establish that the 
defendant’s enrichment is unjust even though the defendant did not violate 
a duty imposed on him by any other legal norm or principle exogenous to 
the field of restitution. 
As was previously mentioned, this Article concerns the meaning of 
"unjust" as that word is used in the southern part of the Republic of 
Restitution, after the "regime change," so to speak, that the shock and awe 
campaign of the R3RUE brought about.  Reduced from the status of a 
"general guide for the conduct of the courts" in the First Restatement,55 the 
concept of unjust enrichment in the R3RUE seems to have become a mere 
label for a conclusion reached on other, purely legal, grounds.56  Described 
in terms of the map, I intend to examine and measure the distance 
separating the inhabitants of Unjust Enrichopolis, who are entitled to 
restitution, from those of Gift Island (located in the middle of the Rightless 
Sea), who are not. 
The ultimate purpose of this Article is to raise awareness about the 
meaning of the concept of unjust enrichment by focusing on a narrow but 
well-defined class of cases in the substantive law of restitution.  Think of 
this as a jurisprudential case study, so to speak, of how the category intent 
to charge is handled in the context of what Chapter 3, topic 1 of the R3RUE 
calls "Emergency Intervention."  Three specific provisions are involved:  
Section 20 ("Protection Of Another’s Life Or Health"), Section 21 
("Protection Of Another’s Property"), and Section 22 ("Performance Of 
                                                                                                                 
 54. But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011) 
(applying substantive (and not just remedial) principles of unjust enrichment to the category 
"Profit Derived from Opportunistic Breach (of Contract)").  The drafters were careful to say 
that this section is a "limited exception" to the general rule, announced in Section 2(2), that 
"[a] valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, 
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment."  Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
 55. FIRST RESTATEMENT introductory note, at 11. 
 56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
Enrichment is unjust, in legal contemplation, to the extent it is without adequate 
legal basis. . . .  In no instance does the fact or extent of liability in restitution 
depend on whether the source of that liability is conceived or described as unjust 
enrichment, as unjustified enrichment, or as a combination of the two. 
Id. 
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Another’s Duty").57  In the situations covered by these rules, the claimant 
has intentionally conferred an unquestionably valuable benefit on another in 
the absence of any actual or supposed contract or request, and often without 
the latter’s knowledge.  Courts granting restitution in such cases do so as an 
exception to the usual rule, which is itself rooted in a "long-standing 
judicial reluctance to encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of 
another by awarding restitution of benefits thereby conferred."58  In such 
cases, courts often use the terms "volunteer" and "intermeddler" (and 
sometimes even "officious intermeddler") to express their conclusion that 
there is no recognized basis for treating the defendant’s enrichment as 
unjust.59 
There is only so much new ground that can be tilled by any committee 
that undertakes to restate a legal field as vast as restitution, and on this 
particular sub-topic, the R3RUE comes out pretty much the same way the 
First Restatement did.  Thus, the commentary to Section 2 of the new 
Restatement says that it is "usually unacceptable" to confer a benefit and 
then seek payment for its value in lieu of "proposing a bargain" to the 
recipient.60  This reluctance to reward benefit-conferring volunteers can be 
traced to a strong policy bias in our legal system in favor of encouraging the 
formation of contract-based relationships:  "Considerations of both justice 
and efficiency require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract 
whenever reasonably possible."61  Judge Posner describes the main reasons 
for this policy preference in the following well-known passage, which the 
new Restatement’s commentary quotes with approval: 
One who voluntarily confers a benefit on another, which is to say in the 
absence of a contractual obligation to do so, ordinarily has no legal 
claim to be compensated. . . .  If while you are sitting on your porch 
sipping Margaritas a trio of itinerant musicians serenades you with 
mandolin, lute, and hautboy, you have no obligation, in the absence of a 
contract, to pay them for their performance no matter how much you 
enjoyed it; and likewise if they were gardeners whom you had hired and 
on a break from their gardening they took up their musical instruments 
to serenade you.  When voluntary transactions are feasible (in economic 
parlance, when transaction costs are low), it is better and cheaper to 
require the parties to make their own terms than for a court to try to fix 
them—better and cheaper that the musicians should negotiate a price 
                                                                                                                 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20–22 (2011). 
 58. 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.1, at 359 (1978). 
 59. Id. § 10.1, at 359–60. 
 60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. d (2011). 
 61. Id. § 2 cmt. c. 
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with you in advance than for them to go running to court for a judicial 
determination of the just price for their performance. 62 
Section 2 of the R3RUE, entitled "Limiting Principles," takes steps to 
codify this general judicial reluctance to make people pay for benefits they 
did not request.  First, it accentuates the plaintiff’s burden of proof in unjust 
enrichment cases by announcing, in Section 2(1), that "[t]he fact that a 
recipient has obtained a benefit without paying for it does not of itself 
establish that the recipient has been unjustly enriched."63  Second, it 
establishes in Section 2(2) that if there is a valid contract defining the 
parties’ obligations, then, at least as to matters within its scope, the contract 
will displace almost all judicial inquiry into the defaulting promisor’s unjust 
enrichment.64  Third, it states in Section 2(3) that "[t]here is no liability in 
restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the 
circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant’s intervention in the 
absence of contract."65  And fourth, it declares in Section 2(4) that an 
"innocent recipient" may not be subjected to a "forced exchange," which it 
defines as "an obligation to pay for a benefit that the recipient should have 
been free to refuse."66 
The most critical provision of Section 2 for present purposes is subpart 
three. Grammatically speaking, this text creates both a general rule and an 
exception:  There is no right to restitution for unrequested benefits 
voluntarily conferred, unless.  Unless what?  The R3RUE recognizes, as 
indeed it must, given the plethora of cases on point, that while it is 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Results, Inc., 513 F.3d 652, 
656–57 (7th Cir. 2008), quoted with approval in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 reporter’s note a (2011). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(1) (2011). 
 64. Id. § 2(2).  Comment c to this section, which is entitled "Restitution subordinate to 
contract," describes the law’s pro-contract bias in situations controlled by Section 2(2) as 
follows: 
Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that private transfers be 
made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible, and that the parties’ 
own definition of their respective obligations—assuming the validity of their 
agreement by all pertinent tests—take precedence over the obligations that the 
law would impose in the absence of agreement. Restitution is accordingly 
subordinate to contract as an organizing principle of private relationships, and 
the terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of unjust 
enrichment within their reach . . . subject to a limited exception in cases of 
profitable and opportunistic breach of contract. 
Id. 
 65. Id. § 2(3). 
 66. Id. § 2(4). 
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"usually" unacceptable for a restitution claimant to confer a benefit and then 
seek payment for its value without having first proposed a bargain, there are 
exceptions: 
There are cases in which a claimant may indeed recover compensation 
for unrequested benefits intentionally conferred—because the claimant’s 
intervention was justified under the circumstances, and because a 
liability in restitution will not prejudice the recipient.  Chapter 3 of this 
Restatement constitutes a catalogue of instances in which such recovery 
may be permitted.67  
I do not intend to dwell in this Article on the doctrinal line dividing the 
usual case, in which restitution is denied, from the special cases described 
in Sections 20 through 22, where there is a presumption that restitution will 
be granted.  Instead, I mean to focus almost exclusively on the R3RUE’s 
treatment of a particular subset of the cases governed by Sections 20 
through 22.  In this subset of cases, the claimant’s ability to recover in 
restitution is said to depend solely on the question of his intent—whether he 
had an intent to charge for his services at the time that he rendered them.  In 
short, I am concerned here with the cases covered by the "unless" clause of 
Section 2(3).  If, as that clause states, "the circumstances of the transaction 
justify the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract,"68 then it must 
also be stated that the new Restatement gives the claimant both good news 
and bad news.  The good news is that you might recover in restitution for 
the unsolicited benefit you have justifiably conferred on the defendant.  The 
bad news is that you will forfeit the right to recover if you acted without 
having something called an intent to charge at the very time you acted.  
Logically speaking, if the general rule is "No recovery for benefits 
voluntarily conferred in the absence of contract," and the exceptions are 
listed in Sections 20–22, then I will be concerned in this Article with an 
exception to the exception—reversion to the general rule of non-recovery 
where intent to charge is absent in cases that otherwise fall within the 
exceptions. 
IV.  The Criteria for Having an "Intent to Charge" 
The word "intent" comes from the Latin intentus, the past participle of 
intendere, which originally signified the act of "stretching out" (tendere) 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. § 2 cmt. d. 
 68. Id. § 2(3). 
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towards something.69  Towards what kind of thing does the concept of 
intent to charge stretch?  Much like its common-law cousin contract, the 
law of restitution has always distinguished between intention and the 
manifestation of intention.70  Legally speaking, an "intention" is classified 
as subjective:  The word is supposed to refer to an actor’s state of mind.  
Intention in this sense is equivalent to what the R3RUE calls "actual 
intent,"71 and what the Restatement (Second) of Contracts calls "real 
intention."72  A "manifestation of intention," on the other hand, is said to be 
objective:  The term refers to what the actor factually says and does within 
a given social context, and has nothing to do with what may or may not be 
going on inside his mind.73 
While the so-called objective theory of contract tends to accord 
primary juridical significance to the category of manifestation of intent in 
constructing a person’s contractual rights and duties,74 the subjective 
category of "intention" plays a much greater role in the sphere of restitution 
law.  For example, the First Restatement, in the course of discussing the 
restitutionary implications of transfers made in anticipation of gratuity or 
contract, states that a person’s manifestation of intent controls if what is 
manifested is intent to create a contract or intent to confer a gift, but that 
"[w]here a manifestation is ambiguous, the intent of the person conferring 
the benefit to receive or not receive compensation controls."75  Thus, you 
can lose a restitution case against someone on whom you conferred a 
benefit that the other has requested when your manifestation of intention is 
"ambiguous" and your actual intention was not to seek compensation.76  
Alternatively, you can "manifest" a gratuitous intent in making a transfer of 
                                                                                                                 
 69. "in-tent." Online Etymology Dictionary, DICTIONARY.COM. http://dictionary. 
reference.com/browse/in-tent. 
 70. See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT § 26 cmt. e & § 57 cmt. d. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 11 cmt. b (2011). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). 
 73. See id. § 2 cmt. b ("The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or 
objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means the external expression of intention as 
distinguished from undisclosed intention."). 
 74. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) (concluding promise 
subjectively meant as a jest or bluff is nonetheless legally enforceable because the 
promisor’s manifestation of intent was to enter into a contract and the promisee was unaware 
of the jest). 
 75. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. d. 
 76. Id. § 57 cmt. d, illus. 8; cf. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 212 (D.C. Cir. 
1973) ("[I]n situations involving personal services, it has been variously stated that a duty to 
pay will not be recognized where it is clear that the benefit was conferred gratuitously or 
officiously."). 
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money to someone, yet still recover in restitution if your unmanifested 
actual intention was not gratuitous.77  Likewise, in Marvin v. Marvin, the 
California Supreme Court held that someone involved in a relationship of 
unmarried cohabitation might recover in restitution for the reasonable value 
of household services rendered to his partner, less the reasonable value of 
support received, "if he can show that he rendered services with the 
expectation of monetary reward."78 
The R3RUE carries forward the First Restatement’s distinction 
between actual intent and manifested intent in a variety of different 
contexts.  Thus, for example, Comment b to Section 11, which deals with 
the effect of mistakes in inter vivos gift transactions, states:  "Where 
conclusive evidence of the transferor’s actual intent is lacking, it will be 
difficult to prove that a gratuitous transfer was in fact the result of a 
mistake."79  Similarly, an illustration to Section 28, which involves benefits 
conferred in the context of unmarried cohabitation between the parties, 
makes the result depend, at least in part, on the court’s finding that the 
services in question were "presumptively gratuitous."80  More to the point, 
however, Comment c to Section 21 (entitled "Gratuitous Services") 
unequivocally states:  "There is no claim in restitution for services, however 
valuable, that the provider has rendered without intent to charge."81 
                                                                                                                 
 77. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 26 (3) ("A person who has transferred money to another 
without intention to make a gift thereof may be entitled to restitution although at the time of 
the transfer he manifested that the money was transferred as a gift."); see also Conkling’s 
Estate v. Champlin, 141 P.2d 569, 571 (Okla. 1943) (concluding manifestation of intent to 
make a gift does not control where other evidence shows "that in finality no gift was 
intended"). 
 78. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 106 (Cal. 1976).  The R3RUE appears to accept 
the Marvin court’s conclusion in cases involving services rendered by unmarried cohabitants 
to their partners (§ 28 cmt. c), although it notes that "claims based purely on domestic 
services are less likely to succeed" than claims based on "direct contributions" to the 
defendant’s assets, such as "money, property, services or a combination thereof" (§ 28 cmt. 
d).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s 
note a (2011) (explaining that the Marvin court’s decision to reject status-based entitlements 
in cohabitation cases in favor of well-founded property claims based on contract or unjust 
enrichment "is the current law of most U.S. jurisdictions"). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 11 cmt. b (2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 80. Id. § 28 illus. 2 (2011).  Compare Kellum v. Browning’s Adm’r, 231 S.W. 459, 
463 (Ky. 1929) (illustrating the rebuttable "presumption of gratuity" where services are 
rendered by someone who stands in a kinship or family relationship to the recipient), with 
Sieger v. Sieger, 202 N.W. 742, 744 (Minn. 1925) (illustrating the rebuttable presumption 
that husband’s transfer of purchase money to wife "was intended as a gift, settlement, or 
advancement to the wife, and not as a resulting trust to the husband"). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c (2011) 
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When considered as legal rather than psychological categories, intent 
to charge and gratuitous intent are what Hohfeld would have called "jural 
opposites."82  To act with intent to charge is eo ipso to act without 
gratuitous intent, and vice versa.  The special case of performing another’s 
duty to supply necessaries to a third person while having what the R3RUE 
calls a "conditional donative intent,"83 though it is factually more 
complicated than the case of supplying benefits directly to the defendant, is 
no different.  The R3RUE treats a claimant who intends that the immediate 
recipient of a benefit not be charged, while at the same time intending that 
the one who owes the recipient a legal duty be charged, as harboring two 
separate pairs of juridically opposite intents:  (1) a gratuitous intent (and 
therefore no intent to charge) vis-à-vis the recipient, and (2) an intent to 
charge (and therefore no gratuitous intent) vis-à-vis the defendant.84 
In these and other situations, the R3RUE seems to distinguish a 
person’s intent from his manifestation of intent on the model of what 
Wittgenstein called the "inner and outer" (Inneres und Aüsseres).85  The law 
treats the "outer," or objective, world of manifested intent as a public text, 
so to speak, that fact-finders are capable of reading and interpreting if they 
are given enough information about the relationship between the parties and 
the conventional standards of meaning that the parties and their community 
employ.86  The "inner," or subjective, world of intention, although 
accessible in principle to the senses of no one but the actor, is treated as a 
private text that nonetheless could have public consequences if the trier of 
fact is given sufficient evidence of its existence.87  Thus, for example, the 
R3RUE offers a pair of illustrations for its conclusion that, in property 
salvage cases, the presence or absence inside the plaintiff of a non-
gratuitous subjective intent would make all the difference to recovery.88  
Although "[t]here is no claim in restitution for services, however valuable, 
                                                                                                                 
(emphasis added). 
 82. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING 12 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 2001). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22 cmt. d (2011). 
 84. Id. § 22 illus. 9. 
 85. 2 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 63–63e 
(C.G. Luckhardt & M.A.E. Aue trans., 1980) [hereinafter REMARKS]. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c, illus. 
7–8 (2011). 
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that the provider has rendered without intent to charge,"89 it says, the result 
would be otherwise if the "trier of fact finds that [the plaintiff] did not act 
gratuitously in preserving [defendant’s] property."90  In stating that "[t]he 
relevant state of mind of the claimant is a question of fact,"91 the 
commentary makes it clear that the distinction between inner and outer is 
alive and well in the law of restitution, even if it is not completely clear 
what kind of "fact" a state of mind is supposed to be. 
Considered from a purely phenomenological perspective, it is no doubt 
the case that "[a] person who intervenes in an emergency will rarely 
consider, at the time of intervention, whether he should charge for his 
services or seek reimbursement for his expenses."92  What, then, does the 
R3RUE mean when it says, "The relevant state of mind of the claimant is a 
question of fact"?93  A brief foray into Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
psychology will help us understand what this question is attempting to ask. 
According to Wittgenstein, it is nonsensical to speak of private states 
of mind such as "intent" (gratuitous or otherwise) as factual in the way that 
material objects are factual—that is, on the model of an object and its 
designation.94  When I speak to you about my intent, I am not typically 
referring to something going on in my head, such as a brain process.95  The 
sentence "I intend to eat the last cookie on the plate" is simply not the 
equivalent of the sentence "A cookie-related neuron just fired in such-and-
such region of my left prefrontal cortex."  Nor do people typically interpret 
another’s statement of intent as a mere label for some sort of mental 
occurrence or feeling that they cannot observe because it is hidden 
somewhere deep inside the speaker.  Although intentions may be 
accompanied by such mental occurrences or feelings, these are not the same 
as the intentions they accompany.96  What is more, an intention, unlike a 
state of consciousness, does not display what Wittgenstein calls "genuine 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. § 21 cmt. c (2011). 
 90. Id. § 21 illus. 8 (2011). 
 91. Id. § 21 cmt. c (2011). 
 92. ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 271 (1978). 
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c (2011). 
 94. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, at 63. 
 95. See HANS-JOHANN GLOCK, A WITTGENSTEIN DICTIONARY 179 (1996) ("Mental or 
physical processes or states are neither necessary nor sufficient for believing, intending or 
meaning something."). 
 96. Id. at 180; LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 591, at 155e 
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]. 
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duration."97  Thus, I can "have the intention of going away tomorrow" 
without having this thought constantly, or even intermittently, on my mind 
today.98 Finally, we would do well to remember that an actor’s description 
or avowal of his intention can have consequences in the world, legal and 
otherwise, that no mere unspoken mental occurrence could ever have. 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein demonstrates this last 
point by means of an iconic example—his famous "beetle in a box."99  
Although the immediate purpose of the example is to explode the idea that 
the meaning of the word "pain" depends on some purely private inner 
experience to which no one but the sufferer has access, the analysis is 
equally (if not eerily) relevant to the case of intent to charge: 
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own 
case!—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it:  we call it a 
"beetle." No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he 
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle—Here it would be 
quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.  One 
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the 
word "beetle" had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not 
be used as the name of a thing.  The thing in the box has no place in the 
language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even 
be empty.—No, one can "divide through" by the thing in the box; it 
cancels out, whatever it is.  That is to say:  if we construe the grammar 
of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and designation" 
the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.100 
From a Wittgensteinean point of view, words that are used to describe 
mental states acquire all of their familiarity and meaning from their "outer" 
use in social life, according to publicly shared criteria, and not from some 
private "inner" experience.101  This implies that a legally significant phrase 
like intent to charge does not "stand for a family of mental and other 
processes."102  Instead, we learn what a person’s subjective intent is in any 
given case by interpreting three publicly observable criteria:  (1) what the 
person avows, (2) his explanation of what he intended, and (3) the context 
in which he acts.103  Now, it would be quite wrong to conclude from all of 
                                                                                                                 
 97. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL § 45, at 10e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von 
Wrights eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1970). 
 98. Id. § 46, at 10e. 
 99. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 96, § 293, at 100e 
 100. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, § 293, at 100e. 
 101. Id. 
 102. WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL, supra note 97, § 26, at 6e. 
 103. See GLOCK, supra note 95, at 180. 
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this that courts are playing a sort of crooked shell game with the word 
"intent," and that underneath the shells of judicial rhetoric about subjective 
or "actual" intention there is no pea.  On the other hand, it would be equally 
wrong to conclude that there is or must be such a subjective intent pea 
hidden there, however invisible it may be to an outside observer.  In short, 
the model of "object and designation,"104 as Wittgenstein puts it, is simply 
unhelpful for understanding what texts like the R3RUE are actually doing 
when they use phrases such as intent to charge in a legally significant way. 
Strictly speaking, the empirically existing world is not made up of 
"facts."  It primordially consists of raw reality itself—of that which keeps 
on coming to the fore and then slipping away in that ever-refreshed present 
moment we call "now."  In law, as in daily life, a proposition of fact is a 
human statement, made within the social context of a shared language, 
about a portion or aspect of reality that has been noticed, selected and 
organized according to some conscious or unconscious criterion.  Thus, the 
R3RUE’s confident assertion that intent to charge and "gratuitous intent" 
refer to facts that must be determined by the trier of fact105 can only make 
sense if the evidence for these legally significant subjective states of affairs 
is public, or, if you will, "objective." Only publicly shared criteria for 
applying the words intent to charge and gratuitous intent can give those 
terms any legal significance in a real case.  In short, the trier of fact, and 
more generally the legal system itself, can only determine what a restitution 
claimant subjectively intended in any given case by examining his words 
(Objective Fact No. 1) and the social context in which he acted to confer 
the benefit in question (Objective Fact No. 2). 
Of course, all of this comes down to saying that these extra-mental 
objective evidentiary facts are criteria for the presence of someone’s 
subjective intent but not symptoms of it.  It makes perfectly good sense to 
talk about the symptoms of something if we have other criteria for 
identifying and describing it.106  Pain, for example, can be a symptom of an 
injury or disease because an x-ray or some other diagnostic tool can 
uncover the pain’s source.  But in the case of intent to charge, the only 
means the law has of identifying and describing a person’s subjective intent 
is to examine what he objectively said (then or now) and to look at the 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. 
 105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 8 
(2011); see also Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. v. Hamil, 140 S.W. 951, 954 (Mo. App. 1911) 
(noting the distinction between gratuitous intent and intent to charge is classified as a 
"question of fact"). 
 106. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 24–25 (2d ed. 1960). 
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objective context in which he acted.  If there are hidden mental occurrences 
to which the legal concept intent to charge somehow refers, then they 
would "cancel out" in the public use of the words intent to charge in exactly 
the same way that the contents of the box in Wittgenstein’s example were 
cancelled out by the public use of the word "beetle."107 
Which party bears the burden of proof on the issue of intent to charge 
is, of course, a different and much more complicated question.  It is a fair 
generalization to say that the R3RUE combines both adherence and non-
adherence to the case law, most of it rather old, on the question of 
restitution in many emergency benefit situations in which the claimant had 
an intention to charge.  For example, after having displayed a small burst of 
independence from tradition in a comment to an earlier draft,108 the final 
version of Section 20 obediently follows the cases in holding that a 
nonprofessional who acts to protect another’s life or health in an emergency 
can never recover in restitution.109  However, who should bear the burden of 
proof on the question of intent where it is relevant is not stated explicitly, 
although there is plenty of authority for the proposition that professional 
rescuers enjoy a rebuttable presumption that their services were rendered 
with intent to charge.110 
In cases involving the performance of another’s duty to supply 
necessaries to a third person in the absence of the sort of emergency with 
which we are dealing here, the First Restatement seems to make the 
                                                                                                                 
 107. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, at 63. 
 108. Comment b to Section 20 of Tentative Draft No. 2 asserted that "a claim in 
restitution based on an emergency rescue by a nonprofessional would be entirely consistent 
with the rule of this Section, in any case in which the court was satisfied (inter alia) that the 
claimant had not acted gratuitously and that the benefit conferred was capable of valuation."  
This language was deleted from the final, published version. 
 109. According to Kronman and Posner, the cases in the area appear to make "the 
presumption of no intent to charge irrebuttable, with the result that the nonprofessional 
rescuer is never entitled to a monetary award."  ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, 
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 60 n.4 (1979).  The drafters of the new restatement 
acknowledge this point.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ 20 cmt. b (2011) ("Emergency assistance rendered by nonprofessionals, however valuable, 
does not give rise to a claim in restitution under existing law."). 
 110. See FREDERIC WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 201, at 314–15 
(1913) (noting services of physicians and nurses "are generally rendered with the expectation 
of compensation"); cf. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390, 390 (N.J. 1953) ("[A]s a physician 
in practice of his profession he naturally intended to charge for his services."). The new 
Restatement appears to accept this line of authority.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20, cmt b, illus. 1–4 (2011) ("The present section 
authorizes a claim in respect of ‘professional services,’ whether the claim is asserted by the 
provider directly . . . or by a third party who pays for the services."). 
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presence of gratuitous intent an affirmative defense.111  If necessaries are 
supplied to a third person in an emergency, however, the First 
Restatement’s blackletter explicitly makes the presence of intent to charge 
an element of the claimant’s case in chief.112  The position of the R3RUE 
on the burden of proof regarding intent to charge in cases of necessaries 
supplied to third persons in either sort of situation is difficult to determine, 
since the blackletter of Section 22, unlike that of Section 114 of the First 
Restatement, does not mention intent to charge, relegating the issue to a 
comment.  One might plausibly think that the allocation of burden of proof 
depends on how the category is described.  If described in terms of the 
presence of "intent to charge," then the burden is on the plaintiff.  If 
described in terms of the presence of "gratuitous intent," then the burden is 
on the defendant.  Unfortunately, the commentary has it both ways:  
Referring to those who intervene "without the intention to seek 
compensation or reimbursement," it states that "[p]ayment or other 
performance rendered with the intention of making a gift will not support a 
claim under this section."113 
The R3RUE’s position on the burden of proving intent to charge in 
cases of emergency property salvage is also unclear, though here the 
drafters reject the most conservative interpretation of the leading cases,114 
according to which the common law (unlike the law of salvage in 
admiralty)115 raises an irrebuttable presumption against recovery for 
services rendered in an emergency to save the defendant’s property from 
imminent destruction.116  In Illustration 8 to Section 21, the R3RUE 
                                                                                                                 
 111. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 113 cmt. e ("[I]n the absence of circumstances indicating an 
intent to make a gift, it is inferred that a person supplying goods or rendering services 
intends to charge therefor."). 
 112. Id. § 114(a). 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22 cmt. d (2011). 
 114. See, e.g., Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887) ("The law will never permit a 
friendly act, or such as was intended to be an act of kindness or benevolence, to be 
afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand."); Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) ("If a man humanely bestows his labor, and even risks his life, in 
voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor’s house from destruction by fire, the law 
considers the service rendered as gratuitous, and it, therefore, forms no ground of action."). 
 115. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-1–14, at 
532–78 (2d ed. 1975) (explaining what constitutes salvage, who may become salvors, and 
how the courts compute and distribute the salvage award). 
 116. WOODWARD, supra note 110, § 207, at 326 ("The doctrine of salvage is peculiar to 
admiralty law, the common law raises an irrebuttable presumption . . . that services rendered 
in an emergency in the preservation of property, like emergency services [by 
nonprofessionals] in the preservation of life, are gratuitous . . . .").  Professor Palmer rejects 
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describes a case in which a claimant, B, who saves A’s property from an 
approaching flood, is said to have a claim for restitution against A, but only 
"[i]f the trier of fact finds that [B] did not act gratuitously in preserving 
[A’s] property."117  The Reporter’s Note states that "Illustration 9 accepts 
the judgment of the trial court that was rejected on appeal in Bartholomew 
v. Jackson,"118 though contrary to the First Restatement, it does not say or 
suggest who bears the burden of proof on the question of gratuitous 
intent.119 
At the end of the day, however, the question of which party should 
bear the burden of proof on the issue of intent to charge is a matter of law 
and policy that can be safely ignored in the context of the present study.120  
However interesting or important it may be, answering this question is 
simply immaterial to my goal, which is to investigate the jurisprudential 
significance of the sheer existence of the legal category intent to charge in 
the substantive law of restitution.  What is most significant for present 
purposes is that the R3RUE advances the view that there can and should be 
recovery in restitution in cases of this sort if either intent to charge or no 
                                                                                                                 
Woodward’s view that the presumption of gratuity in these cases should be irrebuttable, 
stating that "[t]he issue is properly one of fact, to be proved in the usual way."  PALMER, 
supra note 58, § 10.3, at 370.  Keener, too, criticizes the idea that emergency property 
salvors could never recover for their services, even "if it can be shown that [they] intended to 
receive compensation for the services rendered."  KEENER, supra note 13, at 356 (conceding 
that in such cases "the right of recovery is denied by the weight of authority"). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 7 
(2011). 
 118. Id. § 21 reporter’s note c. 
 119. Section 117 of the First Restatement provides that a property salvor is entitled to 
restitution if five specific conditions are satisfied, including the condition stated in Section 
117(d) that the person seeking restitution "intended to charge for such services or to retain 
the things as his own if the identity of the owner were not discovered or if the owner should 
disclaim."  FIRST RESTATEMENT § 117(d).  This arrangement implies that the person seeking 
restitution bears the burden of proof on the issue, since it is listed as a condition of his ability 
to recover.  The blackletter of Section 21 of the R3RUE lists only two conditions, neither of 
which mentions with the issue of intent to charge. Instead, the drafters deal with the issue of 
intent in Comment c and illustrations 7 and 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 7–8 (2011). 
 120. On the law-and-policy implications of burden of proof, Goff and Jones cite Roman 
law for what they call the "appealing" proposition that "the onus should be on the defendant 
to demonstrate that the stranger intended to render his services gratuitously" in property 
rescue cases, because most people are too busy to think explicitly about their motivations in 
emergencies; therefore, they say, to place the burden on the claimant would be 
"unnecessarily severe," given that substantial social benefits accrue from encouraging people 
to save valuable property that would otherwise be destroyed. GOFF & JONES, supra note 92, 
at 271. 
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gratuitous intent can be demonstrated as a matter of fact.  Regardless of 
who must do the demonstrating, the new Restatement’s legal premise that 
intent to charge is some kind of fact in the first place is all that matters here. 
V.  A Thought Experiment to Test the Third Restatement’s Preference for 
the Concept of Unjustified Enrichment 
The time is now ripe to propose a modest thought experiment.  
According to the well-settled law of restitution, "[a] person manifests that 
he does not expect compensation for a benefit which he confers upon 
another if a reasonable person would so believe from what the transferor 
says or does."121  Now let this context-specific manifestation of an intent 
that is gratuitous be absolutely reversed:  Let the claimant objectively 
manifest an intention to charge for everything he does that benefits 
someone else. In particular, imagine that some (or many) people were to 
execute the following document and then take aggressive steps to 
disseminate it, as widely as possible, by such means as giving copies to all 
their friends and acquaintances, publishing it in the legal notices section of 
the local newspaper, posting it prominently on their Facebook pages, 
reciting it out loud to their spouses or partners each and every morning at 
the breakfast table, and so forth: 
  
                                                                                                                 
 121. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
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General Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred 
I make this declaration to enact my sincere and irreversible choice to opt 
out of all social and legal conventions in which the law of restitution and 
unjust enrichment creates a rebuttable presumption that my benefit-conferring 
actions have been performed with gratuitous intent solely by virtue of the 
objective context in which they are performed.  I mean this declaration to 
apply to every non-contractual transfer of benefits by me to someone else that 
may occur now and in the future, with one and only one exception:  Those 
cases in which my actions are accompanied by a subjective intent-in-fact to 
confer a gift that is provable by specific evidence that the thought "I intend 
this to be a gift" was literally present in my consciousness in the form of a 
mental image at the time of my actions.  Therefore, with the exception of my 
contractual relations, whether express or implied-in-fact (wherein the terms of 
said contracts will control my rights and obligations) I hereby solemnly 
declare that I do now intend, and for the rest of my life always will intend, to 
charge and hold accountable for payment any and all persons who receive 
benefits from me (in whatever form) as a result of my actions or inactions, no 
matter how "altruistic" or "gratuitous" they may seem to be to the recipient or 
to an outside observer.  I intend the amount of the charges to be determined by 
the rules and principles which govern the measurement of benefits under the 
law of restitution. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on_________________, at________________________
________________________     ________________________ 
Declarant  Witness 
[Unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746] 
I realize that waving a declaration like this around town is probably 
not the best way to "win friends and influence people," as Dale Carnegie 
famously put it.122  I can even imagine palimony-averse individuals like Lee 
Marvin beginning to cringe at the prospect of their live-in partners trying to 
put them on notice that the free ride is over when it comes to the way the 
law treats the economic value of household services.123  But, in truth, the 
                                                                                                                 
 122. DALE CARNEGIE, HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (1936). 
 123. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123 (Cal. 1976) (establishing the possibility 
of a restitution award for domestic services in cohabitation cases if the claimant "can show 
that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward").  The Marvin court also 
said that the value of the plaintiff’s services in the event he could prove he expected a 
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real point of my thought experiment is not to assess its practical wisdom, or 
even to evaluate its feasibility as a legal strategy for greedy rescuers or 
needy cohabitants.  I am also not interested in addressing the normative 
question of what a court should do with one of these declarations if ever it 
were offered into evidence in a real case. 
The ultimate purpose of the thought experiment is jurisprudential and 
philosophical rather than narrowly "legal."  At the most general level, the 
point I want to make with the Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits 
Conferred is actually quite simple:  In order to remain real, legal concepts, 
like all concepts, must be ceaselessly replenished by the appearance of the 
concrete particulars that they aspire to govern.  Only hitherto unassimilated 
particulars can give the concepts employed in the law of restitution their 
proper weight, and, more importantly, can prevent the legal system from 
depreciating the very idea of reality itself into a farce.  It seems to me that 
this inherently dialectical relationship between the abstract and the 
particular lies at the core of Professor Palmer’s insight that "[u]njust 
enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is 
indefinable," and shows why "[t]his wide and imprecise idea has played a 
creative role in the development of an important branch of modern law."124 
The Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred attempts to 
opt out of the usual default rule in restitution cases involving emergency 
benefits.  A default rule is not an unbending legal command—it is what the 
law will assume to be the case in the absence of evidence to the contrary.125  
In the law of restitution involving benefits conferred in an emergency, the 
general default rule is clear:  "[T]he courts are disposed to assume that the 
claimant’s effort was inspired by altruism or benevolence."126  It will come 
as no surprise to learn that the prevailing law-and-economics view of the 
subject attempts to justify this assumption on efficiency grounds.  For 
example, in one oft-cited article, Landes and Posner have this to say about 
what they call the problem of "altruistic versus compensated rescue": 
Since the enforcement of a legal claim for compensation is costly even if 
the claim is settled rather than litigated, we predict that a legal system 
concerned with maximizing efficiency would refuse to grant 
                                                                                                                 
monetary award would be offset by "the reasonable value of support received" from the 
defendant.  Id. at 122–23.  When the case was retried, it was found that these two numbers 
offset one another, with the result that at the end of the process the plaintiff recovered 
exactly nothing. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 124. 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 5 (1978). 
 125. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 126. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983). 
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compensation in rescue situations where altruism provided a strong 
inducement to rescue attempts. . . .  A legal rule entitling the rescuer to 
compensation in these situations would be inefficient because it would 
substitute a costly legal transaction for a costless altruistic exchange.127 
Although Landes and Posner have undoubtedly provided lawyers and 
judges with a nuanced microeconomic study of the welfare effects of the 
substantive law of unjust enrichment in several different emergency benefit 
situations, it must also be said that their analysis rests on motivational 
premises that are sociologically static.  That is, they unreflectively 
naturalize the social distribution of altruistic and self-interested motives in 
their models, in much the same way that Rousseau naturalized them in the 
eighteenth century.128  These authors merely assume that altruism provides 
"a strong inducement to rescue" in certain types of situations, presumably 
because they believe that many or most people have, in fact, acted 
altruistically in such situations in the past.  Courts, too, tend to naturalize 
the social distribution of altruism and self-interest, as the following passage 
from a well-known nineteenth-century decision, Hertzog v. Hertzog, will 
demonstrate: 
Thus if a man is found to have done work for another, and there appears 
no known relation between them that accounts for such service, the law 
presumes a contract of hiring.  But if a man’s house takes fire, the law 
does not presume or imply a contract to pay his neighbors for their 
services in saving his property.  The common principles of human 
conduct mark self-interest as the motive of action in the one case, and 
kindness in the other; and therefore, by common custom, compensation 
is mutually counted on in one case, and in the other not. 129 
The sort of analysis that is employed by Landes and Posner and in the 
Hertzog decision presupposes that what most people have tended to do 
heretofore in certain types of situations is what they will always continue to 
                                                                                                                 
 127. William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other 
Rescuers:  An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 95 (1978). 
 128. See A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 31, at 46–47 (G.D.H. Cole tr., 1973). 
Throwing aside . . . all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men 
such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple 
operation of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to 
reason, one of them deeply interested in our own welfare and preservation, and 
the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and 
particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death. 
Id. 
 129. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 465 (1857). 
942 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911 (2011) 
do.  But history shows that social and individual arrangements can and do 
change, and that what an earlier age took to be "natural" a later age might 
recognize as "unnatural" (i.e., socially constructed).  It is therefore 
unnecessary to decide whether Professor Palmer was right to call Landes 
and Posner’s article "[a]n unpersuasive attempt . . . to provide an economic 
analysis of the problems" involved in emergency property and life 
rescues.130  For my Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred 
seeks neither to change nor to justify any rule of the common law.  Instead, 
it exploits the law’s default rules by exhibiting the possible emergence of 
no less than a new type of human being. 
In particular, the declaration foreshadows the appearance of someone 
who has chosen to gird his loins for uncompromising competitive struggle 
in the twenty-first century global marketplace, in a manner that coldly 
accepts Heidegger’s depressing diagnosis that modern technology has 
transformed the entire world into a "standing reserve" (Bestand) full of 
human and natural resources whose only purpose and function is to be 
exploited.131  The kind of person who would sign a declaration like this 
would be engaging in a particularly perverse form of what Foucault has 
called "the government of self."132  Such a person would have chosen to 
transform herself into a homo economicus from top to bottom—a money-
grubbing economic creature in virtually all of her interactions with others. 
The idea of declaring under penalty of perjury that the prospect of a 
cash reward, not altruism or benevolence, will always be the mainspring of 
your actions unless you explicitly (and provably) choose to act altruistically 
in this or that particular situation is not merely a direct refutation of the 
courts’ usual default rule in substantive restitution cases.  My thought 
experiment also represents a radical but logical extension of Adam Smith’s 
remark that "[n]obody but a beggar chuses [sic] to depend chiefly upon the 
benevolence of his fellow-citizens."133  One might even say that it invites 
human beings to enter into what Ayn Rand famously called a "utopia of 
greed."134  Since its very existence is made possible by the way the 
doctrinal categories of the R3RUE treat the concept of intent to charge, I 
                                                                                                                 
 130. GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 923 (Cumulative Supp. No. 4, 2010). 
 131. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 17 (William Lovitt trans., 1977). 
 132. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE GOVERNMENT OF SELF AND OTHERS:  LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1982–83 (Frèdèric Gros ed. & Graham Burchell trans., 2010). 
 133. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). 
 134. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 752 (1999). 
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believe that it constitutes an excellent test of the drafters’ expressed desire 
to equate, without leaving any remainder, the concepts of unjust enrichment 
and legally unjustified enrichment.135 
From the point of view of basic legal theory, the formal relation 
between the categories "intention" and "manifestation of intention" in the 
law of restitution is the same as the relation between a question of fact and 
a mixed question of law and fact.  The legal system determines a party’s 
manifestation of intention by looking at what he said and did in a certain 
context (facts) from the point of view of what a "reasonable person" (a legal 
construct) would have taken the facts to signify.136  As a mixed question of 
law and fact, the task of determining a party’s manifestation of intention is 
therefore explicitly interpretive:  It requires the decision maker to apply the 
legal norm of a "reasonable person" to the facts and then reach a normative 
conclusion that either grants or denies recovery.  On the other hand, the 
R3RUE treats the category of a party’s subjective intent to charge as raising 
a pure question of fact, uncontaminated by any need for legal 
interpretation.137  Either the claimant intended to charge for the benefits he 
conferred on the defendant or he did not:  No question of the normative 
reasonableness or justice of his intention seems to be involved. 
As we have already seen, however, resolving the "factuality" of a 
person’s state of mind on this issue depends exclusively on the very same 
kinds of objective evidence that are examined when a manifestation of 
intention is involved—evidence of what the claimant said and did in a given 
context.  But, whereas in the case of a manifestation of intent the trier of 
fact is allowed and required to apply an explicitly normative concept (what 
a "reasonable person" would have understood the facts to mean), in the case 
of a subjective intention, the R3RUE provides for no normative component 
in the process of fact-finding.  Indeed, Comment b to Section 1 appears to 
rule out a priori any assessment of the one normative criterion that would 
be of most assistance, I submit, in resolving the case presented by my 
thought experiment.  I am referring, of course, to the justice of plaintiff’s 
case—to the justice of a case that depends on a court accepting the 
                                                                                                                 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011). 
 136. See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. a ("A person manifests that he does not 
expect compensation for a benefit which he confers upon another if a reasonable person 
would so believe from what the transferor says or does."). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c 
(2011) ("There is no claim in restitution for services, however valuable, that the provider has 
rendered without intent to charge.  The relevant state of mind of the claimant is a question of 
fact."). 
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normative premise that this declaration embodies so aggressively—one that 
goes against the grain of a century and a half of case law. 
To summarize all of this in the form of a rhetorical question:  How can 
the concept of legally unjustified enrichment eclipse any independent role 
for the concept of unjust enrichment if what is legally unjustified depends 
for its determination on a "fact" that cannot be determined without engaging 
in at least some sort of normative interpretation? 
Professor Levmore has expressed the normative premise of the cases 
in this area as follows:  "[O]ne may explain that the law’s treatment of 
volunteers reflects a moral consensus, real or wishful, that extremely good 
and bad deeds are unlikely to be influenced by or simply should not be 
regulated by economic incentives."138  The moral rhetoric displayed in the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn v. Savage illustrates Levmore’s 
point rather nicely: 
The law will never permit a friendly act, or such as was intended to be 
an act of kindness or benevolence, to be afterwards converted into a 
pecuniary demand.  It would be doing violence to some of the kindest 
and best effusions of the heart, to suffer them afterwards to be perverted 
by sordid avarice.  Whatever differences may arise afterwards among 
men, let those meritorious and generous acts remain lasting monuments 
of the good offices, intended in the days of good neighborhood and 
friendship; and let no after-circumstances ever tarnish or obliterate them 
from the recollection of the parties.139 
Texts such as this exhibit a clear ideological commitment to the much-
deconstructed and much-criticized distinction between private and public 
spheres, on which most of the common law of contract, tort and restitution 
is based.140  What we can see in the R3RUE’s treatment of intent to charge 
is a weakening of the line of demarcation between public and private that 
earlier case law established.  By supporting recovery in emergency benefit 
situations in which there is an intention to charge, the R3RUE lifts the veil 
separating the private sphere, where it is said that subjective altruism 
normally rules in emergency situations, and the public sphere, where the 
rigorous objectivity of the commodity form and contract are said to be the 
prevailing norms for social organization. The Declaration of Intent to 
Charge for Benefits Conferred goes even further; it rips off the veil 
completely.  In doing so, it gives us the opportunity to consider whether 
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there is or should be any independent role for the principle of "unjust 
enrichment" in the law of restitution. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Legal concepts classify facts in the way socket wrenches turn nuts and 
bolts:  Both instruments are premade to accommodate only certain types of 
other premade objects.  Every practicing lawyer knows that what the law 
calls "the facts" are not just out there, in the world, waiting to be picked up 
like a nugget of gold on the ground.  Facts are selected and crafted by 
human beings out of something that precedes them in reality, something 
messily particular that always leaves an unclassified remainder when 
pressed into the procrustean bed of a juridical statement that formally 
relates "the facts" to "the law."141  The relationship between an abstract 
legal concept and the particular situation that confronts it on any given 
occasion is therefore fundamentally different than the relationship between 
the law and the facts of a case.  The word "particular" gestures at something 
that has yet to be subdued in the form of any sort of statement—something 
that might very well surprise us and cause us to rethink the standard 
conceptions we have hitherto used to organize and express our 
experiences.142  To ignore the continuing emergence of the particular in 
reality in favor of a single-minded quest to subsume premade facts into 
premade concepts is to engage in what Theodor Adorno called "peephole 
metaphysics."143  A legal system afflicted by unwavering attachment to this 
sort of metaphysics is inherently sclerotic:  It could never bring itself to 
respond sensitively to changes in the world around it. 
Consider what Roberto Unger has to say, from the left, about the role 
of imagination in the study and practice of law: 
Our interests and ideals remain nailed to the cross of our arrangements.  
We cannot realize our interests and ideals more fully, nor redefine them 
more deeply, until we have learned to remake and to reimagine our 
arrangements more freely.  History will not give us this freedom.  We 
must win it in the here and now of legal detail, economic constraint, and 
deadening preconception.  We shall not win it if we continue to profess 
a science of society reducing the possible to the actual and a discourse 
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about law anointing power with piety.  It is true that we cannot be 
visionaries until we become realists.  It is also true that to become 
realists we must make ourselves into visionaries.144 
Now consider what Richard Epstein says, from the right, about human 
nature: 
The key question is why rules governing private property (by which I 
include those dealing with property, contract, and tort) enjoy such great 
temporal durability in the common law.  And the answer is that they 
depend upon assumptions that hold across a wide range of 
circumstances and cases.  There are certain permanent features of the 
human condition that are not dependent on technology or on the 
peculiarities of time and circumstance.  It is to these permanent features 
of the human condition that any sound legal system must respond.  Two 
conditions come instantly to central stage.  First, the scarcity of 
resources is a constant condition for all societies at all times, no matter 
how they are organized. . . .  Second, the widespread, if not universal, 
presence of self-interest necessarily follows.  Any individual who 
practices a form of voluntary and unreciprocated altruism will have 
fewer resources at his command than one who follows the dictates of 
self-interest.145 
One might say that the thought experiment put forward in this Article 
represents a synthesis of the otherwise antithetical sociopolitical points of 
view expressed in these two passages.  On the one hand, the Declaration of 
Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred is clearly a radical attempt to 
"reimagine our arrangements more freely,"146 as Unger puts it, although I 
have no doubt that Unger himself would be personally horrified by the 
direction taken by this particular form of reimagining.  But on the other 
hand, the declaration also seems to be but a simple logical extension of 
Epstein’s claim that "[a]ny individual who practices a form of voluntary 
and unreciprocated altruism will have fewer resources at his command than 
one who follows the dictates of self-interest," and that the immutably paired 
social conditions of economic scarcity and individual self-interest both 
inform and ought to inform how the law is written and applied.147 
However, the foregoing synthesis has a purpose that transcends all 
debates about legal policy in the particular segment of restitution law to 
which it applies.  Legal decisions are more than just official records of the 
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public resolution of private disputes according to well-settled legal rules 
and principles.  They are also more than venues in which the government 
officials called "judges" work out the best possible interpretation of our past 
legal institutions and practices,148 or discover and announce those legal 
rules that best promise to make society better off in the future.149  That a 
legal decision can be portrayed and analyzed as if it were exclusively some 
of these things, or even all of them at once, almost goes without saying, as 
many generations of law students would be able to attest.  But certainly that 
is not all there is to law or even a restatement of the law.  Legal decisions 
are also cultural artifacts in the way that ancient tools or cave paintings are 
cultural artifacts.  Whatever the specific purpose of their creator may have 
been, they also communicate something about the form of life 
(Lebensform), to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, that produced them.150 
If this Article has accomplished its primary purpose, then, it will have 
revealed something significant about the rather petrified sociolegal form of 
life that is imagined by the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust 
Enrichment. 
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